Diversity is a political doctrine in which some social categories (groups) are believed to deserve compensatory privileges because they have been treated badly in the past. This is based on the assumption that New Zealanders are not viewed as individual citizens, but first of all they are identified on the basis of race, sexuality or gender - certainly not just as male and female equal before the law.

Diversity is about state-directed authentication of group identity, but there is no agreed or shared foundation of national identity.  Diversity is the natural consequence of the theory of multiculturalism operating in a relativist and secularised  society.  The concept of an individual citizen is secondary to the notion of group identity.

Some distinction probably has to be made between a secular society and a secularized one.  Historically a secular society is simply one which has no established religion.  Religion however, still plays a significant role in shaping that society's ethics and legal structure.  The United States is an obvious example.  A secularised society is one in which secularism becomes a doctrine and tends to act as an established civil religion.  Religion becomes a matter of mere private concern and has no public function.  New Zealand is moving in this direction.

 In this country we see an ability to acknowledge our past, to respect the diversity of our present and to anticipate and embrace the future as crucial to our nationhood, to our sense of being New Zealanders. Building that sense of nationhood involves recognising our faith and ethnic communities, celebrating with them and understanding what is important to them. We can develop that recognition and greater understanding through interfaith dialogue and working together to enable tolerance, peace and security.

This is an opaque aspiration. The language is characteristic of the proponents of diversity (‘diversiphiles'). But read it again - slowly: its utopian obtuseness is actually reordering traditional moral, religious and political categories. How? Because it employs certain phrases which are being popularised as value-positive, self-evident ‘truths' (small ‘t'). "Faith and ethnic communities" and "interfaith dialogue" sound good, but what reality do they actually describe outside a political rubric? Moreover, it is difficult to know exactly what "interfaith dialogue" actually is. Are we to assume that simply talking about different faiths is somehow facilitating understanding? If so, from what basis do we begin? What set of baseline understandings (presuppositions) will shape the discussion? These questions are seldom, if ever, raised.

 It is critical to observe that moral debate is being carried on with in the context of an assumption which assumes no connection between "tolerance peace and security" and objective truth let alone any notion of transcendent truth.

 Richard Randerson in his reflections at a recent Inter-Faith Forum (Wellington, August 21, 2006) believes that the national diversity statement, "would be a collective affirmation of the freedom of any New Zealander to pursue his or her religion without threat or discrimination." He goes on to say that:

 ...over the last 50 years New Zealand society has moved from the Christendom era, where Christianity was taken for granted as being them all in both private and public life, through an era of secularism, to the current era which is characterised both by a revisiting of the spiritual dimension of life, and by the emergence of a multiplicity of different faiths resulting from global patterns of migration to this country. Multiplicity and diversity should not lead to a diminishment of one's own faith, or to syncretism, but rather to a situation where each affirms his or her own faith, but recognises the presence of other faiths. From that recognition should emerge respect, mutuality and dialogue. Faith of this kind may be described as faith which has a firm centre but open edges. It should also foster a sense of community based on shared values, for which different groups might work together for the common good.

 The question must be asked: Why do we need such a statement? "Revisiting spiritual dimension of life," is not unusual.  And what precisely is the connection between the apparent "revisiting" and the "emergence of a multiplicity of different faiths" in New Zealand. Do we really need to find a new foundation for "respect, mutuality and dialogue?" Again there seems to be an assumption that faith is a purely private affair and the rejection of the reality that the acceptance of one faith could exclude the rejection of another.

 And there is also an assumption here that a statement would somehow facilitate the sort of outcomes Randerson is seeking - but, of course, there is no guarantee of this. Freedom of religious belief and expression is already guaranteed in New Zealand law. Randerson points out that both Singapore and Indonesia have national diversity statements and that presumably it would be a good thing if New Zealand followed suit. Ironically, however, neither Singapore nor Indonesia actually gives its citizens freedom of religious expression and belief as we have traditionally understood that freedom in New Zealand. Something else is going on here so what is it?

 It is important to understand that diversity in the sense being talked about here is not just about equal access to social goods, rather it is an attempt to redefine the goods themselves. Neither is diversity about the practical recognition of different races of people on the street; or even the potential of that diversity to be culturally enriching. In the mind of the diversiphile, the doctrine of diversity will create goodwill and social betterment for everybody because (for example) the lesbian teacher or the middle-aged Pakeha man will learn each other's cultural experience and consequently become better people. It's not a level playing field, though - it will be the middle-aged man who is expected to do most of the learning. Tolerance is critical, but this is a new kind of tolerance. It is not about putting up with somebody, or even respecting him or her as a human being and continuing to disagree - it is about the affirmation of the other because ultimately truth is subjective and social reality is malleable.

 The claim is frequently made that the official adoption of diversity will not lead to syncretism. However, it is difficult to see that in a relativist and secular culture how anything other than syncretism could be the reasonable outcome. Attempting to foster a sense of community on the basis of shared values must result in the acceptance of a values base of the lowest common denominator.  Apparently values which we do not share will have to be rejected.  For example, there is no way that the Muslim and Christian could agree about the nature of God, Jesus Christ, human beings created the image of God or on the nature of forgiveness and redemption. Such a base is likely to please no one. All religions make exclusive truth claims, and while diversity is a political attempt to smother and contain these, they are still there and the defining essence of different religious beliefs.

 One of the problems is that the doctrine of diversity uses the language of Christianity, but is, in fact, an alternative to it. It empties Christianity of the supernatural, and attaches no meaning to critical teachings on sin, forgiveness or redemption. As a secular alternative it shifts the authority of truth away from the individual citizen (given dignity because he or she has been created in God's image) and on to the state. The new ethic is being shaped and reordered by the state rather than the informed conscience of the individual citizen, and, as a result, the separation of church and state is consequently weakened. The new dynamic sees the state usurping the moral authority of the churches in an attempt to create a new, supra and uniting ethic informed by its own beliefs.

 There are in fact, two ‘diversities' and it is critical we distinguish between them because it is the lack of distinction that creates a lack of clarity. ‘Diversity A' as I will call it, is the obvious reality ‘on the street' of people who have come from different countries to live in New Zealand. They speak various languages and retain many visible differences in dress and custom, etc. Diversity A is thus a natural observation of difference and what is evident in any city anywhere where people of different racial and ethic groups congregate and live.

 ‘Diversity B', however, assumes a more conspicuously political stance. People from different countries have traditions considered so robust that we must do all we can to perpetuate them. There are two foundational confusions. The first is that race is confused with culture as though one is interchangeable with the other; the second is that the necessary relationship between religion and culture is seldom understood.

 Scientifically speaking, race is of little, if any consequence - it just is. Culture, however, largely shapes the way we think about ourselves and the world. Diversity B advocates tend to assume that culture is static and that ‘minority cultures' need to be defended from the hegemony of the prevailing culture (a neo-Marxist assumption). Having assumed the doctrine of cultural relativism and having lost confidence in western culture as a civilising reality, all cultures must be rendered equal by the state, but (paradoxically) special favour given to those claiming ‘minority' status  (the confusion of race with culture continues). The role of the citizen and the responsibility of the state to protect the citizen's freedom become secondary to the role of the state in maintaining group equality and the recognition of group identity. Human rights legislation thus becomes a tool to bring about and entrench this manufactured group equality.  Such an eventuality is already implicit in the Human Rights Act, 1993.

 The charge ‘racism' is frequently made when we are really referring to different cultures. Consequently, the language of race allows us to emphasise some cultural differences at the expense of others and inhibit useful and truthful debate. A ready example is found in the legitimate questioning of taxpayer money on Maori initiatives - one cannot go there without knee-jerk reactions from some Maori of ‘racism'. Following on from that, the language of diversity provides a new way of re-categorising ‘race' as a cultural phenomenon. For example, Maori might refer either to somebody who looks Maori, has Maori ancestors and so on; who might be or might not be conditioned by Maori culture. Although most Maori in New Zealand move freely in and out of Maori and Western culture, diversity as a doctrine insists that they belong to one group or the other.  Consequently diversity actually gets in the way of understanding and cultural change.

 Those who insist on diversity as a doctrine frequently invent and impose new group identities in order to give them social recognition and acceptability. For example, the category of sexual non-conformists, ‘gay-lesbian-bisexual- transgendered' (GLBT) does not really correspond to anything in the real world. It simply groups together people of varying sexual orientations and appetites who have been subject to disapproval.  The invention of such a group is simply a method to reorder the acceptability of sexual behaviour which has traditionally been regarded as abnormal or even sinful.

 But the true and totalitarian nature of the diversity doctrine is revealed in how it attends to criticism. Anyone who dares criticise the new trinity of ‘tolerance, diversity and inclusion' is attacked as ‘racist', ‘sexist', ‘homophobic' or ‘xenophobic'. The rich irony here is that those who proclaim the new ethic are anything but tolerant when it comes to those who disagree. Helen Clark's vilification of the Exclusive Brethren - a religious minority - is a case in point, and readily exposes the diversity doctrine for what it is (a shabby lie).

 The following quote is a useful explanation of the new concept of diversity. It is from Diversity; the Invention of a Concept, by Boston Anthropologist, Peter Wood (Encounter Books, 2003. pp307-308):

 The word I have used over and over to characterise diversity is ideology. The word is not neutral; rather, it registers my judgment that diversity offers a closed loop of thought and experience. Once one enters this loop and accepts the main propositions of diversity, it is difficult to see out of it. Like other ideologies, diversity seeks to explain away rather than to explain inconvenient facts. It invests in its possessors emotional commitments and usually attacks the critic rather than answer his criticism. It sets itself up as a way of viewing the world in predetermined categories rather than exploring the world with the possibility of finding new understanding. Diversity is, deep down, static, comfortable and complacently convinced of its own superiority.

 Diversity persists in seeing itself as an underdog, fighting for the oppressed against the oppressors. That diversity itself could be the aggressor is, within that worldview, unthinkable.

 Diversity now is so indispensable to party politics, so rooted in the marketing practices of business, so overwritten into government regulations, and so tenderly looked after by higher education that it cannot simply vanish.

 And indeed it will not vanish if some church leaders continue to buy into it.

 And now some specific comments regarding the 10 points in the draft statement. (The numbers here correspond to each of the points):

1.      The claim ‘New Zealand is a country of many faiths' is, in fact, empirically misleading and buys into the idea that all faiths are equally significant. This is not so when it comes to the sheer weight of numbers (demographically). The 2001 census still has approximately two thirds of New Zealanders claiming to be ‘Christian'. Religions other than Christian are still relatively small, and significantly, the biggest increase is in people claiming ‘no religion'. Conceptually the doctrine of diversity tends to place all religions, including Christianity, on the same foundation. It does not take into account the historical significance of Christianity as the shaper of civil society in New Zealand. Indeed it could be argued that diversity is actually a heresy which distorts Christian tolerance and a love for one's neighbour. The religious truth which gives rise to our traditional understanding of human dignity is replaced by a "rational" one which in turn becomes politicised - what is essentially a moral concept, or even a religious truth, is turned into a political one. And in doing so it reorders the nature of moral and consequently legal authority in civil society. Diversity claims to respect the other but in fact it is really about state recognition and affirmation of groups the state would regard as suffering discrimination of some kind.

2.      This is a very confused claim. The state should not, and need not, treat all religions with equal recognition and respect. It is irrelevant what the state thinks about individual religions. The critical issue here is citizenship. The individual citizen is guaranteed by the state freedom of religious belief and expression. The citizen is also protected from the imposition of religion by the state. The state has an interest only when a particular kind of expression might be a threat to public safety and here it is the job of the courts to work that out. The state should never be in any position to deal with religions at all because when it does so it establishes an official religion (even if it is secularism).  Maybe one further simple point should be made.  There is a difference between the separation of church and state and the connection between religion and politics.  Religion and politics are inextricably bound and there is no reason why religious ideas should not impact political discussion or government policy.  The proper use of reason does not exclude consideration of the transcendent as the necessary foundation to reality.  

3.      This particular claim depends on the doctrine of group identity. It is an individual who has a right to safety and security. Again it is an issue of citizenship.

4.      It is much simpler to talk in terms of citizenship. I am not at all clear what a ‘faith group' actually is (a trade union perhaps?). It has the same vague feel good factor as Maharey's ‘faith community'. Both terms are emotionally loaded and ‘a soft heart', as C S Lewis has said, ‘is no substitute for a hard head'. Moreover, I am not sure what ‘democratic processes' add to the message here. Good relationships have seldom anything to do with democratic processes. The rule of law and human rights legislation might ultimately assist in relationships, but certainly not in the normal day-to-day interaction between individuals. Both law and human rights legislation are there to protect us when things go wrong or to prohibit people from actually doing wrong. At this point it is critical to establish the difference between negative and positive rights. Negative rights are those rights which prevent the state from treating its citizens unjustly. The state is subject to the same rule of law that it imposes on its citizens. Positive rights are those established by the state and which must be delivered by the state, e.g. antidiscrimination rights, rights to an education etc. And most recently, the rights to sexual expression. It is here that we find ourselves confronted by another issue which will have to be developed elsewhere but should be mentioned.  We are moving towards a confrontation between the rights to religious belief and expression and the rights to sexual expression.  The tension is already evident in the Human Rights Act, 1993.  For example, exceptions are made in the context of unlawful discrimination for the purposes of religion.  It is almost certain that in the future this exception will come under attack.  It most certainly will if the doctrine of diversity continues to gather traction.

5.      It is not international conventions which safeguard us but our own laws legislated by Parliament. It might be that New Zealand law is influenced by international conventions but these should not be the basis of our law. It should also be noted that international conventions are not the consequence of a coherent democratic process: they are frequently determined by political appointees, rather than elected representatives.

6.      This principle is opaque nonsense. Individual religions have no power to enforce their religion. The identification of the state and religious communities operating together responsibly confuses the separation of church and state. The church has different responsibilities and a different role to that of the state. The notion of ‘shared commitment' in this context is difficult to comprehend. In general, as a statement of intent, it is unremarkable. But if ‘shared commitment' means some kind of theological or philosophic cooperation we should be very concerned at the implications. The first sentence in bold transcript also seems to have some kind of textual error.

7.      One could say that this is self-evident, however, there is a subtext suggesting that the ideology of diversity is the means by which all of these self-evident goods are to be developed and fostered.

8.      No, they don't: the police, Internal Affairs and others simply need to recognise the rights of individual citizens to be equal before the law. The needs of those of different race or sexuality are already covered in domestic law. Should an issue arise, the place for it to be settled is the courts. The imposition of diversity by various government agencies leads to the imposition of a state morality and the beginnings of civil religion.

9.      This is such a confused paragraph one hardly knows where to start. What on earth does, ‘teaching about religion in schools must be nondenominational and conform to the current educational standards.' mean? If we are talking about Christianity ‘nondenominational' may have some meaning which can be verified historically; however, if we are talking about religions generally, the word is confusing and should be replaced by ‘objective'. Also implicit in this statement is an assumption of neutrality. Apparently the liberal secular state when it promotes diversity can automatically stand in judgement on religion.  The irony should not escape us.  Diversity would promote the kind of understanding but the notion of understanding which diversity preaches is in fact a distortion of Christian tolerance which will be profoundly diminished if diversity is to have its way. We are told that ‘diversity education will promote awareness and sensitivity, mutual reference, friendship and develop a sense of inclusive community and solidarity', but what we really have here is an attempt to use the school system as an instrument of civil religion. The former ethic which had its roots in Christianity is being supplanted by an ethic sustained by the new state civil religion.

10.  Religious diversity is only a challenge to employers because the doctrine of diversity has become so intrusive in the workplace. The placement of ‘reasonably' is unhelpful. It would be more useful to come after ‘accommodate' and before ‘religious' (and was changed to ‘reasonable'). The thrust of this paragraph depends entirely on the authority of human rights based on the doctrine of non-discrimination. This really is an issue that demands intelligent ‘dialogue', or better still simple conversation.

In summary, the entire statement is both unhelpful and unnecessary. It attempts to clarify a complex church and state issue, but only buys into the confusion in the process. It sacrifices important and received historical understandings about the role of Christianity in informing (albeit indirectly) the foundation of law and citizenship in western societies - all this in the attempt to placate and satisfy those with political motives to shape a new secular ethic. Politicised diversity has feet of clay which offers no real substantive basis for unifying different religious expressions. It attempts to deify ‘dialogue' (talking about the problem is seen to be equivalent to doing something about it) but provides no basis from which the discussion can emerge.

Finally some remarks of the notion of citizenship are important.  The secular democratic nation-state sustained by a largely Christian educated population still provides us with the best model for a just and ordered freedom, the separation of church and state and continuing prosperity under a free-market.  Short of paradise and the rule of Jesus Christ it is difficult to imagine anything better.  Nevertheless the nation-state is very much under attack from a variety of sources.  Probably it all began with Marx although of course there were some sporadic attacks before.  But it wasn't really until the 19th century that the nation-state as we presently understand it, got off the ground.

The democratic nation-state owes its continuing existence to a shared national loyalty which each citizen works for and enjoys. An intelligent understanding of the nation's history is foundational to that shared loyalty.  There has to be continuity from generation to generation but such continuity is not averse to change when that change will bring about obvious improvement.  The best kind of improvement usually has its origin in the mind of the ordinary citizen.

Attempts to transcend the nation-state by some kind of international political order or by some new "enlightened" form of government will not help us.  Most migrants come to New Zealand in order to gain New Zealand citizenship and the benefits it offers.  They do not come to experience diversity, tolerance and inclusion.  They come to experience the just rule of law and the opportunities offered by the free-market. They come to experience freedom of worship, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech and a good education. Of course there is a new kind of migrant, encouraged by an apparent opportunity to turn nations like New Zealand into Muslim Dominions.  The ideology of diversity suits them very well.  Fortunately, in New Zealand at least, these kinds of migrants are still in the minority.

Bruce Logan.

Share this page.

• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 

Email this page to a friend.

Add Comment